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CQ.]M.MENTS
Bowersock Mills and O'Neill cases are harbingers of the future judicial ap-
proach to these problems. Time alone will enable us better to evaluate their
significance.
It is submitted that given a bona fide debt of a genuine business corporation,
the courts should follow the statutory mandate and honor the obligation as
an indebedness. One would not be far amiss in noting that the failure to do
so is fast obliterating the line between tax avoidance and tax evasion, despite
the lip service so eloquently paid to the principle that:
"The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise would
be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law permits, cannot be
doubted."53
VOIDANCE OF AGREEMENTS EXEMPTING NEW YORK GARAGES
AND PARKING PLACES FROM LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE
WARREN FREEDMANt
I. TaE STATUTE
"Garages and parking places: agreements exempting from liability
for negligence void.
"No person who conducts or maintains for hire or other consideration a
garage, parking lot or other similar place which has the capacity for the
housing, storage, parking, repair or servicing of four or more motor vehicles,
as defined by the vehicle and traffic law, may exempt himself from liability
for damages for injury to person or property resulting from the negligence
of such person, his agents or employees, in the operation of any such ve-
hicle, or in its housing, storage, parking, repair or servicing, or in the
conduct or maintenance of such garage, parking lot or other similar place,
and any agreements so exempting such person shall be void."'
Beginning with the twenty-ninth day of March, 1949, the effective date of
the above statute, the State of New York took a decidedly progressive step in
the direction of sound legislation which should dispel in at least one field much
of the confusion already inherent in the law pertaining to contractual limi-
tations of liability resulting from negligence.2 In the litigious field of negligence
involving garages and parking places the courts seem never to have marked
out a definite path with respect to contractual agreements exempting such places
from liability for their owner's or employee's negligence. The statute quoted
above represents a forceful and positive declaration of the prevalent common
law and at the same time an adoption of the statutory law governing analogous
53. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 465, 469 (1935).
t Member of the New York Bar.
1. N. Y. GEN. Bus. LAw Art. § 89b (Supp. 1949).
2. The bil was introduced upon the recommendation of the New York Law Revision
Commission. See, N. Y. LEG. Doc. No. 65 (M) (1949).
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situations. All garages, parking places, service stations, or any similar placea
which have the capacity to park, store, service, or repair four or more motor
vehicles4 are prohibited from contracting against liability for damages for in-
jury to person or property due to negligence, if the place is conducted or
maintained for hire or other consideration.5 The damage resulting from the
negligence of the garage owner, his agents or employees0 is covered, and all such
exculpatory agreements are declared void.
The language of the statute might have been more carefully drawn so as to
eliminate much of the difficulties with definitions, even though the provisions
of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law are referred to as a source of definition.
Therein, "parking" is defined as the stopping upon a public highway and the
leaving of a motor vehicle "unattended by a person capable of operating it, for
a period longer than necessary to load or unload passengers or freight." 7 The
irrelevancy of this definition to the context of the statute is apparent since the
statute under discussion is concerned with stopping, not on a public highway,
but on an open lot, place, or location, or in a covered place or garage owned
by a person operating or maintaining a "parking" business.8 Moreover, the
definition of "motor vehicles" under Section 2 (8) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law
appears to be rather inappropriate to serve the purpose of the statute.9 Simi-
larly undefined is the term "person,"'1 and the question whether garages and
parking places owned or operated by the state, county or a municipality are
3. Note the "open end" phrase here. See generally Jones, The Parking Lot Cases, 27
GEo. L. J. 162 (1938).
4. N. Y. VEMCLE & TRAmc LAW § 2 (8) (Supp. 1948) reads as follows:
"'Motor Vehicle' shall include all vehicles propelled by any power other than muscular
power, except motor cycles, traction engines, road rollers, fire and police vehicles, tractors
used exclusively for agricultural purposes, tractor cranes, power shovels, road building
machines, snow plows, road sweepers, sand spreaders, well drillers, trucks with small
wheels used in factories, warehouses and railroad stations and operated principally on
private property, and such vehicles as run only upon rails or tracks."
5. Another "open end" with respect to "consideration."
6. On the vicarious liability of an employer, see Gorchar v. Bauer, 13 N. Y. S. 2d 328
(Rochester City Ct. 1939) and Goldberg v. Kung, 45 A. 2d 279 (Md. 1946). Where garages
undertake to deliver vehicles to and from the garage and cause injury, the owner of the
vehicle under § 59 of the N. Y. Vehicle & Traffic Law becomes liable to the person injured
(Zuckerman v. Parton, 260 N. Y. 446, 184 N. E. 49 (1933)). However, the ultimate
liability should rest upon the garage owner. See Drollinger v. McCurdy, 228 App. Div. 664,
238 N. Y. Supp. 219 (2d Dep't 1929) ; Leonardi v. Bassett, 161 Misc. 324, 291 N. Y. Supp.
947 (N. Y. City Ct. 1936); Svenson v. Zakrocki, 268 App. Div. 777, 48 N. Y. S. 2d 567
(2d Dep't 1944); Blake v. Salmonson, 188 Misc. 97, 67 N. Y. S. 2d 607 (Syracuse Munic.
Ct. 1946).
7. N. Y. VEnmcLE & TRAmc LAW § 2 (20).
8. The question may be raised whether a car owner who sits in his auto while "parked"
on a lot or in a garage for a consideration is covered by the above statute since control
and possession are not in the garage or parking lot owner.
9. See note 4 supra.
10. N. Y. GEN. CoNsTRucnToN LAW § 37, defines "person" as including the state, county
or city only when designating a party whose property may be the subject of any offense.
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included therein is unanswered."
Precedent for according similar treatment to garages and open-air parking
lots is found in the New York case of Galowitz v. Magnr. 21 Similarly Babbitt
in his work entitled The Law Applied to Motor Vehicles declares that "one
who takes cars at such a place [an open-air parking lot] assumes the duties of
a bailee for hire just as if the car was left in a covered garage."13 The Admin-
istrative Code of the City of New York also treats garages and parking lots
together in its licensing and regulating provisions3 4
II. CONTRACTUAL LItn=ATION OF LAIIiTY iN NEW You.
Businessmen have always sought to protect themselves by contract from
liability caused by their own negligence. The earliest New York rule on the
subject, found in Gould v. Hill,'* invalidated such an agreement by a carrier.
The court declared that a carrier had no right by contract to limit its common
law liability or to evade the consequences of a breach of its duty. Shortly
thereafter in Moore v. Evans 6 and in Dow v. New Jersey Stean Navigation
Co.,' 7 the courts began to permit carriers by special contract to limit their
liability in respect to certain specified risks provided the contract was fairly
and voluntarily entered into by the passenger or shipper.
In 1872 the New York Court of Appeals in Cragin v. New York Central
R.R.'8 extended the doctrine still further by allowing contractual exemption
from liability even for losses resulting directly from the carrier's own negligence.
11. That the question raised is not entirely academic may be gathered from the follow-
ing language used on two separate parking receipts which were issued to the author by
two different N.Y. State Park Commissions, subsequent to the effective date of the N.Y.
General Business Law:
(1) "All persons individually and collectively concerned in the operation of this parking
field accept this automobile for storage and upon the express understanding and condition
that they shall not be responsible for the loss of, nor any damage to, this stored automobile
nor for loss of, or damage to, contents or part of this stored automobile.
"These provisions apply regardless of any loss or damage being due to negligence of
the Finger Lakes State Park Commission or any Concessionaire or any of their employees
or from any other cause of any name or nature.
"Acceptance of this check ratifies the agreement contained in the above conditions."
(2) "The Long Island State Park Commission provides parking space for automobiles
and attendants to assure the orderly parking of cars, but neither the Commisson nor the
State of New York accepts any responsibility for loss or damage to the car or its contents,
and the person accepting this receipt thereby releases the Commission and the State from
any responsibility for such loss or damage."
12. 208 App. Div. 6, 203 N. Y. Supp. 421 (2d Dep't 1924).
13. BABxrr, TEE LAv APIPLIED To MOTOR VEHIC.S § 860 (4th ed. 1933).
14. Art. 34 added by the Laws of 1947. Section B 32-250.0 defines a garage or a
"building, shed or enclosure or any portion thereof" and a parking lot as any "outdoor
space or uncovered plot of ground" which has the capacity to hold five or more motor
veddes "and which is used to accommodate, store or keep any motor vehicle for the pay-
ment of a fee or other consideration charged directly or indirectly."
15. 2 Hill 623 (N. Y. 1842). See generally, 28 HAPiv. L. REv. ,50 (1915).
16. 14 Barb. 524 (N. Y. 1852).
17. 11 N. Y. 485 (1854).
18. 51 N. Y. 61 (1872).
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In that case the defendant railroad transported hogs from Buffalo to Albany.
In consideration of a reduced rate the shipper agreed to assume the risk of
injuries from various causes including heat. Forty-three hogs died of heat
enroute, due to defendant carrier's negligence in not watering and cooling the
hogs by wetting. In the action to recover damages the court denied liability,
overlooking completely the common law liability of a carrier for the safe carriage
and delivery of property entrusted to its care. The court in passing considered
the "vitality of the freight" and the fact that the carrier "does not absolutely
warrant live freight against the consequences of its own vitality. Animals may
injure or destroy themselves or each other; they may die from fright or from
starvation because they refuse to eat, or they may die from heat or cold."19
The court further declared:
"In this State it is well settled that a carrier may, by express contract,
exempt himself from liability for damages resulting from any degree of
negligence on the part of his servants, agents or employees. '20
The court also ruled that there was sufficient consideration for the special
contract limiting liability.
The importance of the Cragin decision was somewhat lessened years later in
Kenney v. New York Central & H. R. R.R. 21 where the court, though echoing
the language of the Cragin decision by saying that "the rule is firmly established
in this state that a common carrier may contract for immunity from its negli-
gence, or that of its agents" went on to state that considerations of public
policy based upon the nature of the carrier's undertaking required that the
exemption from liability be "read in agreement ipsissinsis verbis"22 and held
that the words of exemption in the case before the court were too general to
preclude recovery. Cases supporting the Cragin opinion proceeded on the theory
that a carrier's contract with his shipper was a private matter with which the
public properly has no concern; and if the parties freely and voluntarily con-
tracted to exempt the carrier from all liability, the presumption was that the
carrier parted with sufficient consideration for the exemption. 23 Today in a
world of fast-moving carriers, with greater capitalization and far-flung business
connections, as well as improved safety devices, the contract between the carrier
and the shipper should no longer be considered a purely private one, The
carrier and bailee for hire has public responsibilities and added duties of safe
carriage and proper delivery.
19. Id. at 63. The New York Court of Appeals some nine years later distinguished
the Cragin decision by stating that even at common law a carrier was not liable for the
vitality of freight. Holsapple v. Rome, W. & 0. R.R., 86 N. Y. 275, 279 (1881).
20. 51 N. Y. 61, 64 (1872).
21. 125 N. Y. 422, 425, 26 N. E. 626, 627 (1891).
22. Id. at 425, 26 N. E. at 627. See also Boyle v. Bush Terminal R.R., 210 N. Y.
389, 104 N. E. 933 (1914); Blair v. Eire Ry., 66 N. Y. 313, 318 (1876) (concurring opinion
of Allen, J.) ; Perkins v. N. Y. Central R.R., 24 N. Y. 196, 206 (1862).
23. See generally N. Y. LEG. Doc. No. 65 (M) (1949). See also Smith V. N. Y. Central
R.R., 24 N. Y. 222, 238 (1862) (dissenting opinion by Allen, J.).
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Ill. STATUTORY REGULATION OF LIMTATION or LUnMiTy
The result of the Cragin case was, however, expressly overruled in 1913 by the
enactment of Section 38 of the New York Public Service Law:
"... No contract, stipulation or clause in any receipt or bill of lading
shall exempt or be held to exempt any common carrier, baggage com-
pany, transfer company, railroad corporation or street railroad corporation
from any liability for loss, damage or injury caused by it to property from
the time of its delivery for transportation until the same shall have been
received at its destination and a reasonable time shall have elapsed after
notice to consignee of such arrival to permit of the removal of such property.
Every common carrier, baggage company, transfer company, railroad
corporation, and street railroad corporation shall be liable for all loss,
damage or injury to property caused by delay in transit due to negligence
.... the burden of the proof shall be upon the defendant to show that such
delay was not due to negligence." 24
This section renders the carrier liable for the full value of the baggage or freight
but requires a value in excess of $150 to be stated on the receipt and permits
the carrier to charge a reasonable sum for the assumption of liability in excess
of 150.
Since the advent of Section 38 of the Public Service Law, the status of garages
and parking places as quasi-public enterprises much like "common carriers,
baggage companies, transfer companies, railroad corporations or street railroad
corporations" has been undergoing a change. In the early case of Smitl v.
O'Brien the garage was said to be "the modem substitute for the ancient livery
stable."2 Professor Ingram in his study, The Automobile and the Law, has
stated that "it may therefore be taken as a primary proposition that the general
rule established by the courts defining the rights and duties of keepers of livery
stables apply to and govern garage keepers."20 Closely allied are the innkeepers
whose common law liability was based upon their duty to provide every traveler
a public shelter from highwaymen and the rigors of the weather.
-'
That public garages and parking lots are affected with a public interest is
manifest from the fact that they are subjected to regulation. The Administrative
Code of the City of New York requires a license where the garage or parking
lot has the capacity to hold five or more motor vehicles; a schedule of rates
must be filed and conspicuously posted; vehicles must be stored or parked in
a manner approved by the regulating authorities and failure to pay a judgment
will result in suspension or revocation of the license.28 The constitutionality of
such regulations, as well as of the above statute, seems clear:
"... by the weight of authority, it is within the province of the Legis-
lature, in the exercise of its police powers, and in the absence of any consti-
24. N. Y . PuB. SER. LAw § 38.
25. 46 Alisc. 325, 327, 94 N. Y. Supp. 673, 674 (Sup. Ct. 1905).
26. INGRAm, Tim AuromoBun AND = LAw 90 (1911).
27. PRossm, ToRTs 382 (1941).
28. N. Y. C. ADrm. CoDr, Art. 34 § b, 32-250. o to 32-258 (Supp. 1948).
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tutiona, restrictions, to authorize municipalities of a state to direct the
location of and regulate the construction and use of property as, public
garages and supply stations for automobiles."
2D
Nineteen years ago in Strauss & Co. v. Canadian Pacific Ry., the New York
Court of Appeals held:
"By those various statutes the will of the Legislature has been clearly
expressed to the effect that contracts which purport to totally exempt in
the cases named from liability for negligence are against the public policy
of the State, and the early decisions, which expressed a different view and
represented the public policy of the State when made, have been superceded.
Public policy is necessarily variable. It changes with changing conditions.
It is evidenced by the expression of the will of the Legislature contained
in statutory enactments." 30
IV. THE GARAGE KEEPER AND PARKING LOT OWNE r AS A BAILEE
One of the earlier English common law decisions on provisions in a bailment
contract attempting to limit liability was written in 1815 in Maving v. Todd.3 1
There, a bailee expressly limited his liability for loss by fire and effect was given
to the limitation, irrespective of the cause of the fire. Since then English law
has generally permitted an ordinary bailee to limit liability resulting from his
own negligence, upon the ground that every individual has a right to contract
without interference.3 2 In the United States, the courts have reiterated this doc-
trine3 3 One commentator has declared that "contracts exempting a bailee from
liability for negligence are primarily concerned with individual property rights
and the alleged tendency to encourage negligence thus is overbalanced by the
greater interest in the freedom to bargain as one pleases." 34 A Pennsylvania
court, however, in Lancaster County National Bank v. Smith3 r has held that
"a bailee cannot stipulate against liability for his own negligence." Stipulations
by bailees for hire seeking immunity from liability have been frowned upon.
The determination whether a garage or parking lot owner is a bailee
29. 7 BLASM"nED, CYCLOPEDIA or1 AuTomonr. LAW AND PRAcrzc § 4901 (perm. ed.
1935).
30. 254 N. Y. 407, 413, 173 N. E. 564, 569 (1930).
31. 1 Stark. 72, 4 Campbell 225 (K.B. 1815).
32. Van Toll v. South Eastern R.R., 12 C.B. N.S. 75 (1862); Gibaud v. Great Eastern
Ry., [1921] 2 K.B. 426 (C. A.); Rutter v. Palmer, [1922] 2 K.B. 87 (C. A.).
33. Sante Fe, P. & P. Ry. v. Grant Brothers Construction Co., 228 U. S. 177 (1913).
See also Willis, The Right of Bailees to Contract against Liability for Negligence, 20 HARV.
L. REv. 297 (1907). Contra: Williams v. H. L. Weil & Co., 1 La. App. 188, 191 (1924):
"It is elementary that a bailee or depositor cannot in any such manner or in fact In any
other manner exempt himself from responsibility for his own lack of care or prudence."
See, Jersey Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Syndicate Parking Co., 78 N. E. 2d 692 (Ohio 1948).
34. Note, 86 U. oF PA. L. REV. 772, 778 (1938).
35. 62 Pa. 47, 55 (1869).
36. Albert & Davidson Pipe Corp. v. Gibney Iron & Steel Co., 110 N. J. Eq. 285, 159
Atl. 676 (1932). See also 12 Foiw. L. REV. 178 (1943).
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for hire, a lessor of the space,36 or a licensor of use of all the space,37
presents a little problem. "The storage of motor vehicles in a garage
is that form of bailment known technically as locatio custodiae, which
involves the letting of the care and the custody of a thing for hire. This is
one of the mutual benefit bailments .... "38 The analogy to the warehousemen
is immediately evident. But in order "to constitute a bailment there must be a
delivery of the subject of the bailment to the bailee, either actual or construc-
tive, and there must be such a full delivery of the property to the bailee as will
entitle him for the period of the bailment to exclude from possession thereof
even the owner. . . . "39 Thus, possession or control of the motor vehicle by
the garage or parking lot owner distinguishes a bailment from these other
relationships.40 An interesting case arises where the employee of a parking
lot owner refuses to permit the driver to lock his car in order to be able to
move the car. In Keenan Hotel Co. v. Funtk,41 the Appellate Court of Indiana
held a bailment was created when the driver had to give up his car key to the
garage owner. Therefore, the bailee was held liable for loss of the car by theft.
But where the plaintiff drove into the fair grounds, paid admission fee for him-
self and his car, parked in space specially provided, but did not deliver the car
into the custody of the agent of the fair ground association, nor receive a check,
no bailment was created.42 Similarly, in a Missouri case43 where the plaintiff
entered an amusement park with his car, parked it gratuitously in the place
provided by a city policeman who was not an agent of the amusement park,
locked the car and left it, no bailment relationship existed. In the Administrative
Code of the City of New York the language implicitly treats the relationship
of garage or parking lot owner and the driver of the motor vehicle as a bail-
ment by requiring the issuance of claim checks. A garage or parking lot owner,
whether the vehicle is delivered for storage, repairs or supplies, is generally
considered to be a bailee for hire,45 and "the usual rule applies to a garage
keeper that as a bailee for hire he cannot by contract so limit his responsibility
that he is not liable for his own negligence, or the negligence of his em-
ployees.... ,,46 In the very recent case of Malone v. Santora;17 the Connecticut
37. Ashbry v. Tolhurst, [1937] 2 K.B. 242 (C. A.). Note that a licensor, like a land-
lord, has no duty to take reasonable care of the chattel.
38. BABBITT, op. cit. supra note 13, § 858.
39. 7 Br Snmvx , op. cit. supra note 29, § 4661.
40. 12 FoRD. L. REv. 178 (1943).
41. 93 Ind. App. 677, 177 N. E. 364 (1931). See also, 7 BrLAsuzmx, op. cit. supra note
29, § 4668.
42. Lord v. Oldahoma State Fair Ass'n, 95 OkIa. 294, 219 Pac. 713 (1923).
43. Suits v. Electric Park Amusement Co., 213 Mlo. App. 275, 249 S. W. 656 (1923).
44. N. Y. C. Ananar. CODE, ArL 34, § B 32-256.0 (Supp. 1948).
45. I aI., op. cit. supra note 26 at 90. See also, Burt v. B. AT. Supply Co., 67 Idaho
548, 186 P. 2d 498 (1947).
46. BABBITT, op. cit. supra note 13, § 866. Wendt v. Sley System Garages, 124 Pa. Super.
224, 188 At. 624 (1936); Downs v. Sley System Garages, 129 Pa. Super. 68, 194 At. 772
(1937).
47. 135 Conn. 286, 291, 64 A. 2d 51, 54 (1949).
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court held a parking lot owner to be a bailee for hire, and stated that:
".... the provision against liability printed on the ticket could not avail
the defendant to bar recovery by the plaintiff. This is so because of the
'well-recognized rule that the right of a bailee for hire to limit his liability
by special contract does not go to the extent of relieving him against his
own negligence' [citing cases]. The reason is that such a provision is
'revolting to the moral sense and contrary alike to the salutary principles
of law and a sound public policy.'"
However, "a garage keeper or parking lot owner is not an insurer of the
safety of cars entrusted to him as bailee for hire, and is not liable for mere
deterioration not due to his fault .... "48 In the absence of good faith, the
bailee for hire is liable only for his negligence.
V. RELATIONSHIPS ANALOGOUS TO GARAGE AND PARXING LOT BAILMENTS
Under the terms of Section 89b of the New York General Business Law, a
garage or parking lot owner cannot contract away the duty of reasonable care
imposed by law. Some states have declared such exculpatory provisions in a
contract to be contrary to public policy, even in the absence of statute,40 and
by what appears to be "the weight of authority, a garage keeper or repairman,
as a bailee for hire cannot by contract so limit his liability as not to be liable
for his own negligence, or that of his servants acting within the scope of their
employment, with respect to the performance of the duties assumed by him."50
Analogies to the prohibition of a garage or parking lot bailee for hire exempt-
ing himself by contract for liability for negligence are found in the law on
48. See 7 BIAsHBFI-, op. cit. supra note 29.
49. See, N. Y. LEO. Doc. No. 65 (M) (1949) and cases cited. In Hotel Statler Co. v.
Safier, 103 Ohio St. 638, 642, 134 N. W. 460, 462 (1921) the court opined: "As a ballce
for hire impliedly contracts to use ordinary care, it follows that he may not contract
against his own negligence or the lack of such care. An implied agreement generally can
have effect only in the absence of a contrary express agreement." What the Ohio court
undoubtedly meant was that the agreement to use care is so obvious, that any contrary
express agreement should be disregarded as repugnant to the essential character of the
relationship.
50. 7 BLASMnuFD, op. cit. supra note 29, § 5040. In Munger Auto Co. v. American
Lloyds, 267 S. W. 304 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924), the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, deemed
the problem one "of apparent conflicting authorities. In many of the opinions where the
question has been discussed the direct question (of the right of the bailee for hire to exempt
himself by contract for his negligence) was not involved. . . . The weight of authority
seems to hold that where there are no statutory provisions to the contrary, a contract made
between the bailee and bailor by which the bailee relieves himself from liability due to
his or his employee's negligence, is valid, at least as against all but gross negligence. We
can see no valid reason for denying parties who receive automobiles for repair the right
to make a contract limiting their liability in case the cars should be stolen ...
" . . . If parties to a contract desire to limit their liability, where the limitation Is not
against public policy nor against the statutes the courts will enforce same."
[Vol. 18
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warehousemen, 51 keepers of livery stables,62 common carriersp innkeepers
and hotel keepers,54 landlords or lessors of space,5 safe deposit companies,15
and public checkrooms. 57
The American Law Institute in its Restatement of the Latz of Contracts has
two pertinent sections on limiting liability for negligence. Section 574 states:
"A bargain for exemption from liability for the consequences of negli-
gence not falling greatly below the standard established by law for the pro-
tection of others against unreasonable risk of harm is legal, except in the
cases stated in section 575."
An examination of the state annotations to the Restatement reveals that seven
out of twenty-seven states did not concur with the language of Section 574.Ps
Section 575 (1) (b) of the Restatement declares a bargain for exemption to be
illegal if "one of the parties is charged with a duty of public service and the
bargain relates to negligence in the performance of any part of its duty to the
public, for which it has received or been promised compensation." Unanimity
of the state and federal annotations is accorded this section, except for limita-
tions based upon varying reduced rate provisions which give the bailor suf-
ficient choice.! 9
VI. CASES NoT COVERED By THE STATUTE
Where Section 89b of the New York General Business Law, for one reason
or another, is clearly inapplicable or of doubtful application, several important
factors must be considered. These include: (1) The necessity of notice; (2)
51. Uz-aom WAREHOUSE Ilr Aci, 3 U. L. A. §§ 2, 3; N. Y. G.N. Bus. LAW § 91.
See, Adler v. Bush Terminal Co., 161 Misc. 509, 291 N. Y. Supp. 435 (Sup. Ct. 1936), aff'd,
250 App. Div. 730, 294 N. Y. Supp. 726 (2d Dep't 1937). Blashfield states that the garage
keeper is in effect a warehouseman. (7 BLAsmEEW, op. cit. supra note 29, § S022).
52. In Hanna v. Shaw, 247 Mass. 57, 59, 138 N. E. 247, 248 (1923), the court observed
that "The rights, duties and liabilities of garage keepers are analogous in many respects
to those of livery stable keepers and warehousemen."
53. Common carrirs under the Uniform Bills of Lading Act (4 U. L. A. § 3) may not
insert in an intrastate bill of lading a provision exempting themselves from liability for
negligence and such exculpatory provisions are void under the Harter Act (27 STmr. 445
(1893), 46 U. S. C. §§ 190-195 (1946)).
54. N. Y. GFN. Bus. LAW § 201.
55. N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 234. The constitutionality of this voidance of an excul-
patory clause was upheld in Billie Knitwear v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 288 N. Y. 682, 43 N. E.
2d 80 (1940).
56. N. Y. BAxN=G LAW § 331 (1). See Sporsem v. First Nat. Bank, 133 Wash. 199,
204, 233 Pac. 641, 643 (1925).
57. See, Kar v. H. & M. Parcel Room, Inc., 270 App. Div. 538, 541, 61 N. Y. S. 2d
285, 288 (1st Dep't 1946).
58. The seven states were Connecticut, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Penn-
sylvania, Washington, and West Virginia.
59. See Norfolk Southern R.R. v. Chatman, 224 U. S. 276 (1916); N. Y. Central R.R.
v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357 (U. S. 1873); Anderson v. Erie R.R., 223 N. Y. 277, 119 N. E.
557 (1918) ; D'Utassy v. Barrett, 219 N. Y. 420, 114 N. E. 786 (1916) ; Glinsky v. Dunham
Reid, Inc., 230 App. Div. 470, 245 N. Y. Supp. 359 (1st Dep't 1930).
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the nature of the receipt; (3) the choice of reduced rates; (4) the "degrees"
of negligence; and (5) the effect of custom.
(1) Where the motor vehicle owner delivers the vehicle to the garage or
parking lot under a claimed exemption from liability, sufficient notice of the
disclaimer must be shown.60 In the New York case of Galowitz v. Magner6'
the plaintiff put his car in parking space adjacent to a bathing beach, paid
fifty cents, and received a ticket, on the back of which in fine print was
written: "The person accepting this ticket assumes all risk of accident, and
expressly agrees that the managements shall not be liable under any circum-
stances for any injury to person, loss, or damage." The Appellate Division held
the disclaimer by the bailee for hire to be invalid because notice to the plaintiff
was inadequate. In a Georgia case a sign posted in a public garage, "Not
responsible for fire, theft, or articles left in cars," did not relieve the garageman
from liability for negligent acts of himself or his servants.
0 2
(2) In the notable bailment case of Sandier v. Commonwealth Station Co.,03
the Massachusetts court held that "it could be found to be a reasonable assump-
tion by the plaintiff that the stub that was given him was a receipt for his
automobile, or a means of identifying him when he should return to get his
automobile rather than a contract freeing an apparent bailee from all responsi-
bility. '64 Generally, claim checks are not contracts6" since the mutual assent
necessary to the formation of a contract is lacking, and the bailor does not
always read the check. 66 A repair order containing a provision that the garage-
man assumed no responsibility for loss or damage by theft or fire has been
held not to absolve him from his own negligence. 67 Such receipts or tokens of
identification are unlike carrier passage contract tickets which contain express
limitations on the amount of the carrier's liability for loss of passenger's prop-
erty taken on the voyage. 68
(3) The responsibility of a bailee for hire may be diminished; or even
increased7" if a true choice of rates, depending upon limitation or non-limitation
from liability, is given to the bailee.
60. Ohge v. LaSalle-Randolph Garage Corp., 328 Ill. App. 665, 66 N. W. 2d 725 (1946).
61. 208 App. Div. 6, 203 N. Y. Supp. 421 (2d Dep't 1924).
62. Renfore v. Fouche, 26 Ga. App. 340, 106 S. E. 303 (1921); Weinberger v. Werre-
meyer, 224 Ill. App. 217 (1922).
63. 307 Mass. 470, 30 N. E. 2d 389 (1940).
64. Id. at 474, 30 N. E. 2d at 391.
65. Marine Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Rehm, 177 So. 79 (La. App. 1937).
66. See Note, 86 U. oF PA. L. REv. 772, 773 (1938) (citing Cascade Auto Co. v. Petter,
72 Colo. 570, 212 Pac. 823 (1923) and Dietrich v. Peters, 28 Ohio App. 427, 162 N. E. 753
(1928)).
67. Sign Animation Corp. v. Wilkie Buick Co., 129 Pa. Super. 234, 188 Atl. 628 (1936).
68. Reichman v. Compagnie General Transatlantique, 290 N. Y. 344, 49 N. E. 2d 474
(1943).
69. BABBrr, op. cit. supra note 13 § 866. On the question of "choice" of contracting
with or without limitation, see, Roseweb Frocks Inc. v. Rose, 52 N.Y. S. 2d 901 (N. Y.
Munic. Ct. 1945); Mickey Finn Clothes, Inc. v. Yale Transport Corp., 175 Misc. 242, 23
N. Y. S. 2d 84 (N. Y.- Munic. Ct. 1940).
70. The bailee may enlarge ordinary responsibility by agreement and assume the liability
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(4) It has been stated that the weight of authority rejects the idea of
degrees of care and that: "There are no 'degrees' of care as a matter of law;
there are only different amounts of care, as a matter of fact; and gross negli-
gence is the same thing as ordinary negligence, with the addition, as Baron Rolfe
put it, 'of a vituperative epithet.' "71 Yet decisions persist in distinguishing de-
grees of negligence in authorizing contractual limitations on liability for "ordi-
nary" negligence.72 The difficulty originated in 1704 in Coggs v. Bcrnard 3
which recognized the varying degrees of slight, ordinary, and gross negligence.
The distinctions have been repudiated in England74 and rejected generally as
vague and impracticable in their nature, unfounded in principle.75 In any event
a bailee for hire may not limit the degree of care for which he will be respon-
sible to less than that fixed by statute. An Oklahoma statute declares: "A
bailee for hire must use at least ordinary care for the preservation of the thing
bailed."7 6 In Scott Auto & Supply Co. V. McQuCCn 77 the plaintiff left his car
to be painted at a garage where a large sign was posted denying responsibility
for loss by fire. The Oklahoma court, applying the statute, refused to allow the
garage owner, by notice or by contract, to release himself from the duty im-
posed by this statute to exercise ordinary care.-Is
(5) Any custom or practice of garage keepers or parking lot owners, con-
trary to the implied obligations of a bailee for hire, of which the owner of the
automobile was unaware, cannot in any way absolve the keeper from the
observance of the necessary care.70
VII. REASONS FOR THE STATUTE
Various factors today justify the statutory prohibition of contractual limita-
tions upon liability on the part of public garage and parking lot owners. It has
been pointed out that the nature of the garage keeper's calling, conjoined with
the nature of the subject matter of the bailment, for example, its mobility and
the easy access which garage attendants have to its use, coupled with the dif-
ficulty the bailor would experience in detecting and proving its unauthorized
use, suggest that responsibility more strict than in the case of the ordinary
of an insurer, Pennroyal Fair Ass'n v. Elite, 195 Ky. 732, 243 S. W. 1046 (1922); Smith
v. Economical Garage, 107 Mo. 430, 176 S. W. 479 (1919).
71. PRossna, ToRTS 258 (1941).
72. Munger Auto Co. v. American Lloyds of Dallas, 267 S. W. 303 (Tex. Civ. App.
1924) ; Langford v. Nevin, 117 Tex. 130, 298 S. W. 536 (1927).
73. 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (1703).
74. Grill v. General Iron Screw Collier Co., L.R.I. I C.P. 600 (1866).
75. SATmoh'D, TORTS 462, n. a (9th ed. 1934). See also, Leonard v. Bartle, 48 R. L 101,
135 At. 853 (1927); Union Traction Co. v. Berry, 188 Ind. 514, 121 N. E. 655 (1919);
Reed v. Western Union, 135 Mo. 661, 37 S. W. 904 (1896).
76. OKiA. ComrP. STAT. § 5206 (1921).
77. 111 Okla. 107, 226 Fac. 372 (1924).
78. See also, Interstate Compress Co. v. Agnew, 255 Fed. S03 (8th Cir. 1919); Morse
v. Imperial Grain & Warehouse Co., 40 Cal. App. 574, 181 Pac. 81$ (1919); Inland Com-
press Co. v. Simmons, 59 Okla. 287, 159 Pac. 262 (1916).
79. Simms v. Sullivan, 100 Ore. 487, 198 Pac. 240 (1921).
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bailee.80 Moreover, exemption provisions would have a tendency to induce a
lack of care.8 '
Public policy favors the voidance of agreements exempting bailees for hire
from liability for negligence where there is a great disparity of bargaining power
between the bailor and bailee82 and the lack of automobile storage space in
large cities such as New York creates such a disparity. This condition may not
exist elsewhere in the United States, for example, Chicago, if one commentator,
who favors freedom of contract, is accurate in his appraisal.83
VIII. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
Like every statute, Section 89b of the New York General Business Law will
require judicial interpretation. A number of questions are left unanswered.
For example, does the statute apply to public garages and parking lots operated
by a municipality, a county or the state; to businessmen who operate parking
space for patrons; to service stations which allow "free" parking to accom-
modate customers? Does the prohibition against disclaimer of liability apply
where a true bailment is lacking; for instance, where the owner of the vehicle
has not surrendered complete possession and control to the garage or parking
lot operator? Have garages and parking lots covered by the statute become
by virtue thereof public service institutions which are obliged to accept all
customers without discrimination?
While there is no essential inconsistency between the licensing and regulatory
provisions of the New York City ordinance and the statute, it would appear
that uniformity of treatment should suggest an amendment of the New York
City ordinance to reduce the capacity standard to four vehicles.84
CONCLUSION
The enactment of the statute will mean a shifting of the responsibility and
the burden for loss or injury from the vehicle's owner to the bailee for hire,
where in justice such burden and responsibility belong. Those who for profit
80. 12 FoRD. L. REv. 178, 181 (1943).
81. N. Y. Central R.R. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357 (U. S. 1873); Southern Express Co.
v. Owens, 146 Ala. 412, 41 So. 752 (1906); Cole v. Goodwin and Story, 19 Wend. 291,
281 (N. Y. 1838).
82. F. A. Strauss & Co. v. Canadian Pacific Ry., 254 N. Y. 407, 173 N. E. 564 (1930);
PROssER, TORTS 381 (1941).
83. 8 U. oF Cm. L. REV. 763, 765 (1941).
84. While N. Y. C. ADamn. CODE Art. 34, § B 32-250.0 (Supp. 1948) requires a license
for garages or parking lots which have a capacity for holding five or more vehicles, Art. 11,
§ C 19-66.0 requires a certificate of fitness for an attendant of a storage garage containing
four or more vehicles. For the sake of uniformity, it would seem that the licensing and
regulatory provisions of the New York City ordinances should be amended to designate a
minimum capacity of four motor vehicles as enough to warrant the treatment of garages
and parking lots as affected with a public interest, whether it be for licensing and regulatory




take over the possession and care of a motor vehicle, with all its potentialities
for harm to itself and others, should bear the risk of loss. From the practical
and economic viewpoint, the enactment of the statute will undoubtedly entail
a slightly higher storage, parking or garage rate to compensate for increased
insurance premium. Anyone but a cynic would hope for a corresponding re-
duction in the insurance premium of the motor vehicle's owner.
